

<https://helda.helsinki.fi>

Populists, Identitarians and Integralists - Varieties of Christian Political Conservatism Today

Saarinen, Risto

2020

Saarinen , R 2020 , ' Populists, Identitarians and Integralists - Varieties of Christian Political Conservatism Today ' , Interkulturelle Theologie , vol. 46 , no. 2 , pp. 349-363 .

<http://hdl.handle.net/10138/338153>

unspecified

acceptedVersion

Downloaded from Helda, University of Helsinki institutional repository.

This is an electronic reprint of the original article.

This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.

Please cite the original version.

POPULISTS, IDENTITARIANS AND INTEGRALISTS

Varieties of Christian Political Conservatism Today

Risto Saarinen

Political leaders and academic scholars are paying increased attention to the alliance between conservative Christians on the one hand and nationalist-populist politics on the other. These alliances are by no means new in Western history; the twentieth century alone witnesses to a large number of problematic alliances of this kind. What is new is the growing popularity of such joint ventures in the twenty-first century. Scholars and politicians of my generation have been accustomed to consider them as completely outdated currents. Now we suddenly see that both the young and the elderly, men and women alike, are being inspired by nationalist-populist movements and that these movements embrace conservative Christianity with much more determination than the established political parties.

Academic scholars should not offer too quick explanations of this phenomenon. We are barely seeing its rough outlines, and declaring it as a result of societal change, or as nostalgia or resentment, is not very helpful as long as we do not know well enough the actual ideology that sustains the phenomenon.¹ While my own political leanings are liberal and I am deeply worried about national-populist movements, I do not feel that I can present an exhaustive intellectual or theological evaluation of their claims. What I can do is to lay out an initial documentary survey. The first step towards responsible understanding is to study carefully the existing evidence and read the scholarship which we already possess.

The following presentation proceeds in three steps. First, I show how significant populist leaders seek support from conservative Christians for their populist-nationalist cause. This is evident in countries like Poland, Hungary, and the United States, and we already have some studies which analyse those countries.² I will, however, restrict my discussion to three Nordic countries, that is, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In these countries the coalition between conservative Christians and populists is fairly strong, but we do not yet know well enough why this is the case. As the societal situation in Scandinavia is very different from Hungary or the U.S., the same sociological explanations may not apply.

Second, while populist politics appeals to large audiences, it is also important to see the fundamental intellectual currents behind its Christian-nationalist rhetorics. For the present, two such currents are visible especially in digital environments. The first current, *identitarianism*, originated in France about twenty years ago and has provided ideological background for the

populist parties in France, Italy, Hungary and Germany. Identitarians have also many links to Northern Europe and the English-speaking countries. The second current, *Catholic integralism*, has only become visible during the last five years. Its current strongholds are located in Poland and the United States.

Third, after presenting a survey of these two currents, I will very briefly discuss the reactions of some other Christians to the populist movements. I can only offer a couple of examples without claiming that they are representative.

I Populist and Christian Causes in Norway, Sweden and Finland

In Norway, Sweden and Finland the growing populist parties are actively seeking new supporters from among other conservative citizens. Because of this bigger trend, the Christian democratic parties in these three countries need to define their own relationship to nationalism and populism. If these currents are completely rejected, some conservative Christians may feel neglected and move to the populist parties, especially as the populists claim to represent good old Christian values. On the other hand, if the Christian democrats adopt a more nationalist and populist programme, they may lose other supporters and, more importantly, the political opportunities to build coalitions with other parties. In Norway, Sweden and Finland, Christian parties are fairly small and need a coalition with others to be influential. In all three Nordic countries, governments are typically constituted as coalitions of many different parties. Collaboration is therefore necessary even when ideologies differ.

The Christian Party in Norway (*Kristelig Folkeparti*, KrF) received 13.7 % of votes in the election of 1997 and its leader Kjell Magne Bondevik served as prime minister between 1997 and 2005. After that, KrF's support collapsed. In 2017, KrF received 4.2 % of all votes. Especially after the European refugee crisis of 2015, the Norwegian populist Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*, Frp) has grown. One of its most outspoken representatives has been Sylvi Listhaug who was appointed the Minister of Immigration in 2015 and in this capacity stopped the wave of immigrants with new and strict policies.

Listhaug is a devoted Christian who underlines her religious conviction. She thinks that the big majority Church of Norway is too liberal and that even the free churches, whose voters are traditionally close to KrF, have betrayed their members with liberal and Humanist immigration policies. With Listhaug, Frp very programmatically addressed the Christian voters to leave KrF and to find their nationalist and Christian values much better taken into account in her own populist Frp. In this manner, "a battle for the cross" between these two parties takes place in Norway.³

Listhaug argues that immigration has become a defining issue which gives its colour to all political issues. During the last four years, Listhaug has worked

in different leading positions in Norwegian politics, always criticizing the all-too-friendly attitudes of other politicians towards Islam and immigration. After many turbulent changes and strong statements, the Progress Party is in January 2020 one of the four bigger parties in Norway, whereas KrF has remained small. In her 2018 book, Sylvi Listhaug appears in the cover with a very visible Christian cross, arguing that the church in Norway is rotting in its roots. This is because the liberal church has become a political arena which no longer proclaims Christian faith.⁴ The Christian party in Norway is struggling with this message, as Frp is its natural coalition partner when governments are formed. KrF has nevertheless kept distance to straightforward populism.

In Sweden, the populist Swedish Democrats party (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD) has grown significantly and is today one of the bigger parties with about 20 % share in opinion polls. The SD has a positive view of Christianity as part of Sweden's national heritage. However, its relations with the Church of Sweden are tense, as its bishops keep consistent distance to SD. In the elections, SD has often proclaimed that it wants to replace the leftish and liberal trend of the majority church with a vision of faith that is conscious of its own tradition.⁵ However, the SD does not practice any consistent programme to win Christian voters from other parties in the manner of Listhaug in Norway.

In December 2014, other Swedish parties made an agreement not to build coalitions with SD. For this reason, SD has remained in the opposition until today. The formal agreement was, however, already dissolved after nine months when the Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*, KD) voted against it. Among Swedish parties, KD has been the most willing to collaborate with SD. Already in the very same day when the December agreement was made, Sara Skyttedal, a very visible young politician of KD, wrote that she is against the agreement. As leader of the KD between 2013 and 2016, she often argued that the KD should adopt stances which are closer to the populist and nationalist politics of SD.

Skyttedal was also the top candidate of the KD in the European elections of 2019. The KD received 8.6 % of all votes in this election, the best result ever achieved by this small party. Skyttedal's nationalist course was thus rewarded by the Christian Democratic voters. While Skyttedal is more moderate in her opinions than Listhaug in Norway, it can be said that under her leadership the Swedish Christian Democrats have adopted a political course which brings them closer to the populist-nationalist stance.

In Finland, the populist Finns' party (*Perussuomalaiset*, PS) has also grown in recent years and is currently the biggest party with more than 20 % of support in opinion polls. The previous leader of the party, Timo Soini, is a devout Catholic, and the current vice-leader Laura Huhtasaari is a qualified high-school teacher of religion and an outspoken defender of Christian values. The small

Finnish Christian Democratic Party (*Kristillisdemokraatit*, KD) is traditionally supported by evangelical and free church Christians and has since many years a share of about 4 % of all voters. Like its sister parties Norway and Sweden, the Finnish KD has an identity crisis, as the populists also support conservative values and are winning voters with this politics.

For the present, the Finnish KD has not taken a clear stance with regard to populism. While the party leader Sari Essayah is very moderate, some other KD politicians openly approach the populists. This became evident in April 2019, when a group of KD and PS politicians published a joint statement regarding the freedom of speech. They claim in the statement that “conservative Christians and nationalist friends of the fatherland are discriminated”. In their commentaries they stress that their freedom to criticize Islam, immigration and gender-neutral marriage has been seriously restricted by the liberals.⁶

In Norway, Sweden and Finland we can thus observe a development in which conservative Christians consider that a new coalition between Christian Democrats on the one hand and the populist-nationalist movement on the other is necessary. This development is motivated by the strong growth of populist parties in all three countries as well as by the identity problems of small Christian parties. Politically speaking, these trends can be interpreted as moves which aim at winning a maximum number of voters.

As a theological scholar, I am also interested in the ideological forces and constructions which are employed in arguing for these political moves. In an earlier paper, I analyse a Finnish online journal, *Oikea Media* (“the true media”) from this perspective. This journal brings together conservatives from PS and KD. Many theologians and university teachers are regular contributors to *Oikea Media*, and the journal often treats Christian topics in detail. In its digital environment, *Oikea Media* can be regarded as a think tank which develops arguments for the Christian causes in populist-nationalist politics.⁷

One of my essential findings is that *Oikea Media* uses extensively many European sources to find support for these causes. Particularly prominent among these sources are the so-called French identitarian thinkers. This was a surprise for me, as one does not initially expect that the Finnish populists would use French intellectuals to argue for their cause. However, I soon learned that the digital environment is a global seedbed for populist thinking. All material is easily available in English, and it can be transformed into national language and contextualized for the particular environment at hand.

This observation leads to the second part of my presentation. The Christian populist movements are supported with ideological currents which supply them with suitable arguments for the political debate. These currents flourish in the digital environment which enables their effective dissemination. In a somewhat paradox manner, the intellectual frame of nationalism is therefore very

universalist and multinational. Until now, I have only studied this phenomenon as it appears in Finnish digital media, but the role of the internet is probably similar in other countries as well. Let us turn to two important ideological currents of this kind.

2. Identitarians and Catholic Integralists

The intellectual father of French conservative New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*, ND) is Alain de Benoist. Since the 1970s, he opposes the liberal universalism of Western Europe and emphasizes the right to difference. For de Benoist, the biggest threat to European countries is the “planetary homogenization” or the “ideology of the same” which does not allow room for different identities.⁸ De Benoist’s thinking has inspired many movements against globalism and the European Union. The French populist party *Front Nationale* (nowadays *Rassemblement Nationale*) has transformed these ideas into a defense of nation-state and traditional national values.

In the wake of the new millenium, a more radical movement distinguished itself from the ND. This new movement came to be called the “identitarians”. Guillaume Faye’s book *Why We Fight: Manifesto of the European Renaissance* (in French 2001) is regarded as the foundational text of the identitarians. Faye advocates ethnocentrism, an ideology claiming that European civilization can only survive if the different national identities are taken seriously and preserved. Faye’s companion Pierre Vial launched the journal *Identité*, in which thinkers close to Front National party can think about the ethnic dimensions of identity. The magazine *Terre et Peuple* became an even more important organ of this movement.⁹ Since 2003, the so-called *Bloc Identitaire* has gathered French identitarians to present an overall ideology of the movement. Other movements, often employing the term identity, have emerged in France, Germany and the U.S.¹⁰

Guillaume Faye’s later book *The New Jewish Question* (in French 2007) moved the anti-globalist front to consider the Islamic immigration as the main threat to Europe. Faye argues that the growth of Islamic communities in central European countries causes problems that are similar to the so-called Jewish question in Nazi Germany. Such comparisons cannot, obviously, be supported by political parties, and the identitarians came to be a kind of ideological alternative right. They have no voice in populist parties as such, but often their ideology and arguments are mentioned by individual politicians. Remarkably, the anti-globalist and anti-EU arguments of the identitarians are also used by the alternative left. The anti-immigration stance thus serves as an identity marker which distinguishes alt-right from the alt-left.

Another important identitarian book of this kind is Renaud Camus's *The Great Replacement* (in French 2011). This book launches the idea of a transformation of European ethnic proportions. As the Muslim population grows much faster and has a much higher birth rate than the European civilizations, the Muslims will outnumber Europeans in near future also in the European heartlands, Camus claims. This argument, even if politically incorrect, continues to be repeated by many European populist politicians.

Originally, religion did not play much role in the New Right and identitarianism. As the Catholic church is global and supports European Union, Catholic thinking was rather seen as an opponent of ethnocentrism and nationalism. Around 2013, this evaluation started to change. Dominique Venner, a central figure of the movement, committed a ritual suicide at the altar of the Notre Dame of Paris as a protest against the fall of European civilization. He became a venerated martyr who connected religious symbols with the identitarian movement. At the same time, identitarians and conservative Catholics became allies in the opposition against new marriage laws in France. They created a joint movement, *La Manif pour tous*, which employs as its symbol a heteronormative family, a father, mother, son and daughter who hold hands together.¹¹

In the digital environment, this and other similar symbols became memes which were adopted by very different conservative movements. In Russia, Vladimir Putin's supporters use this family meme. In Finland, it is adopted by conservative Christians who oppose homosexual marriage. Such interactions make it easy and natural to disseminate ideas across different nationalist and populist movements in Europe. The Swedish activist and publisher Daniel Friberg focuses on translating the seminal works of French identitarians into English. Friberg's publishing house *Arktos*, located in Budapest, spreads this material very effectively in paper as well as in the web.¹²

In spite of the recent alliance between identitarians and old-fashioned Christians the ideological connections between the two are somewhat artificial. Originally, the French New Right was secularist. While Catholics also oppose homosexual marriage and defend cultural values, Catholic universalism is nevertheless incompatible with the anti-EU and ethnocentric policies of the identitarians. Most importantly, the identitarian thinking remains marginal as an intellectual achievement. It can produce slogans and memes, but there are not many academics who would support it as a serious intellectual programme. Identitarians can make provocative statements but populist parties and bigger Christian groups cannot adopt their ideology as a whole. Some parts of it, especially those related to immigration politics and the growing number of Islamic communities in Europe, nevertheless continue to exercise a strong influence in populist parties and conservative Christian circles.

In the last five years, conservative Christian intellectuals have started to develop a more ambitious and consistent nationalist ideology. This ideology is called Catholic integralism, or simply integralism, and it has found considerable support in Poland and the United States. In very simple terms, integralism says that the nation-state or the secular power should adapt its laws to the truth of the Christian faith. The doctrine was shaped over the centuries in the struggle between the pope and the earthly rulers. Its current shape is often compared with the so-called *Kulturkampf*, the culture wars in Prussia one hundred years ago. Especially American conservative Christians compare the cultural wars in today's U.S. with the German *Kulturkampf*, considering that secular liberalism should be subordinated to the truth that is available in the Catholic (or Protestant) church.¹³

An influential version of new Catholic integralism is outlined in Ryszard Legutko's book *The Demon in Democracy*.¹⁴ Legutko is Professor of Philosophy at Jagellonian University in Krakow and a member of the European Parliament. He has served as minister in Polish government and represents a much higher level of political and intellectual influence than the identitarians discussed above.

Legutko argues that communism and liberalism are like twin brothers or two sides of the same coin. Liberalism is as totalitarian as communism and, as such, basically intolerant and violent ideology. Both liberalism and communism stem from the Enlightenment belief on the reason which inevitably leads all humans to a predetermined end. Legutko argues that liberalism only makes lip service to freedom and diversity. In reality, its rule of reason demands conformism and discriminates those who do not obey others. As liberalism is an individualist ideology which destroys home, family and religious communities, it leaves the human being completely alone. In such a state, the basic need of reason is to conform with others.¹⁵

Post-Communist societies like Poland have attempted to replace communism with liberalism, but Legutko considers that they now realize how liberalism in fact destroys the true meaning of humanity and forces everyone to be egalitarian. In the end, liberalism is nothing more than ritual and sacramental performance of compulsory testimonies: "The liberal-democratic mind, just as the mind of any true communist, feels an inner compulsion to manifest its pious loyalty to the doctrine. Public life is full of mandatory rituals in which every politician, artist, writer, celebrity, teacher or any public figure is willing to participate, all to prove that their liberal-democratic creed springs spontaneously from the depths of their hearts."¹⁶

Legutko defends the government of Viktor Orban in Hungary, as its "mild illiberalism" corrects the worst manifestations of liberalism. Like Orban and many other post-Communist leaders, Legutko is against the so-called "open

society” ideology as outlined by the philosopher Karl Popper and disseminated by Popper’s student, the Hungarian-American investor Geoge Soros. Legutko wants to replace contemporary relativism and postmodernism with a communitarian vision which affirms the church, the family and other stable institutions which can act as true counter-movements to the dangers of totalitarianism. He pleads for such conservatism which is no longer found in the European Union: “The E.U. is predominantly left-wing, sometimes radically left-wing, and erstwhile conservative parties—for instance, the -Christian-democratic parties of Germany and Italy—have long since capitulated to the leftist agenda.”¹⁷

In his anti-globalism and conservatism, Legutko is fairly similar to the French identitarians and the Nordic populists who criticize the local Christians for their liberalism. However, Legutko is not a marginal thinker but a politician who also exercises a considerable influence in American Catholicism. He regularly publishes in *First Things*, a conservative Catholic magazine which has re-launched the theoretical debate on Catholic integralism.

Two other academically visible Catholic integralists are Adrian Vermeule, Professor of Law in Harvard, and Patrick Deneen, Professor of Political Science in Notre Dame University. Deneen makes arguments that are fairly similar to those of Legutko. As a Catholic, Deneen considers that Catholics should reject liberal forms of life and return to such integralism which makes no compromises with the liberal state. Deneen argues that liberalism is intrinsically problematic, as its promises of freedom demand strict control mechanisms and strict egalitarianism in order to deliver the promises.¹⁸

Adrian Vermeule converted to Catholicism after having realized that there is no middle ground between atheist materialism and Catholic faith.¹⁹ He opposes what he calls “the relentless aggresion of liberalism” and considers that liberal politics is always hostile to the Church in the end. With Deneen and Legutko, he thinks liberalism to be a kind of religious heresy which can only be counteracted by going back to the roots of the Catholic faith. Vermeule argues that Christians should advise political rulers as Christians. For him, this does not need to mean nationalist or conservative spirit but something which he labels as “strategically Christian.”²⁰ But he does think that liberal governments should be replaced with Christian politics which apply Catholic principles simply because they are true and manifest the natural law.²¹ In this sense he is an integralist.

While Legutko, Deneen and Vermeule often quote one another and share common Catholic conviction as well as common anti-liberal attitude, they may differ to some extent with regard to populism and nationalism. In March 2019, *First Things* published a manifesto titled “Against Dead Consensus” which is signed by Deneen and fourteen other thinkers (but not by Legutko and Vermeule). This manifesto is clearly both nationalist and populist. It rejects the

so-called consensus conservatism which compromises with liberal and multicultural values. What is required now is a new sort of conservatism that highlights nationalist values.

These nationalist values go together with support for President Donald Trump's policies, and the final part of the manifesto therefore states as follows:

In recent years, some have argued for immigration by saying that working-class Americans are less hard-working, less fertile, in some sense less worthy than potential immigrants. We oppose attempts to displace American citizens. Advancing the common good requires standing with, rather than abandoning, our countrymen. They are our fellow citizens, not interchangeable economic units. And as Americans we owe each other a distinct allegiance and must put each other first. ... We embrace the new nationalism insofar as it stands against the utopian ideal of a borderless world that, in practice, leads to universal tyranny. ... Whatever else might be said about it, the Trump phenomenon has opened up space in which to pose these questions anew. We will guard that space jealously.²²

As integralism is a very recent phenomenon, it is difficult to evaluate it properly. One clear conclusion is nevertheless that integralism succeeds in creating a position which can be both Catholic and nationalist at the same time. In the earlier European discussion, Catholic position has for the most part been multicultural and universalist. However, after the criticism of open society and liberalism one can say that governments should operate on the basis of Catholic principles, giving priority to one's own nation. Remarkably, the manifesto also uses French identitarian rhetorics, for instance, in mentioning the alleged fertility of the immigrants and the borderless ideology of the same.

While political integralism might work in Poland, it remains theoretical in the United States. However, Catholic integralism and the 2019 manifesto make it possible for many Catholics to state that the new American nationalism is theologically better than the earlier universalism of many Catholic thinkers. Given this, Catholics can now say that they must put their American countrymen first and oppose immigration. This is no crude nationalism but a carefully elaborated version of anti-liberal integralism. Nevertheless, it also supports new nationalism as its end result.

3. Christian Responses to Conservatism

In August 2019, the manifesto prompted a critical theological response in the magazine *Commonweal*. The response was directed against new nationalism and it was signed by a diverse group of theologians, including Stanley

Hauerwas, Cornel West, Miroslav Volf and several colleagues of Deneen from Notre Dame. The group includes Protestants, Catholics and Orthodox and many of signatories are rather non-liberal than liberal in their general theological attitude. The discussion has also continued in *First Things* and the issue of nationalism seems to divide American Catholics as well as other theological voices.

The *Commonweal* response rejects the kind of nationalism put forward in the manifesto. At the same time, the response claims to represent an attitude which is nevertheless patriotic, claiming that “nationalism is not the same as patriotism. Nationalism forges political belonging out of religious, ethnic, and racial identities, loyalties intended to precede and supersede law. Patriotism, by contrast, is love of the laws and loyalty to them over leader or party.”²³ Such a distinction may sound somewhat unusual for European readers, but it needs to be understood in its American context.

In any case, the *Commonweal* response shows that nationalism is again a debated topic in academic theology. The present paper has shown three distinct layers in contemporary discussion on populism and Christianity. First, the relationship between populist parties and traditional Christianity, exemplified with the help of three Nordic countries, can be approached in terms of political opportunism. Second, the identitarian arguments add to this political discussion an ideological dimension which needs to be understood and elaborated by theologians. However, the French identitarians nevertheless represent a marginal position in intellectual and academic terms. While this position may move significant electoral groups, it often manifests extremist slogans rather than consistent programmes.

Third, Catholic integralism as put forward by Legutko, Deneen and Vermeule claims to be a serious academic, theological and political alternative. Its challenges are only beginning to emerge in the broader debate. It may be, however, that this variant is already prominent in countries like Poland and Hungary. In Viktor Orban’s government we see a nationalist ideology which connects Orban’s own somewhat theocratic Reformed tradition with conservative Catholic leanings.²⁴ Such coalition can be supported with the arguments of Legutko against liberalism and open society. This third wave is not yet visible in Scandinavia, but I would not be very surprised if some of our anti-liberal Christian intellectuals receive it in near future.

Let me finally return to Western Europe, asking how the established churches react to the reality of populist parties. In Germany, one visible debate concerns the relationship between the Evangelical Church (EKD) and the populist party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD). In 2017, AfD was invited to speak at the EKD national gathering, *Kirchentag*. This created several problems which led to a new policy. In 2019, AfD was not invited to the *Kirchentag* in

the same manner as other democratic parties. This resembles the situation in Sweden insofar as the Swedish Archbishop Antje Jackelen has kept a clear distance to the populist SD.²⁵

In Finland, a similar discussion took place in the preparation of our Church Day in 2019. The bishop of Helsinki, Teemu Laajasalo, invited the leader of populist PS, Jussi Halla-aho, to a discussion at the Church Day. This decision was criticized by many others. However, the discussion took place. Its defenders argued that the Finnish policy is to include everyone and that the church should not make a priori distinctions between political parties. While the Finnish policy can be defended in this manner, it is different from the current policies in Sweden and Germany.²⁶

The Lutheran World Federation has recently published a very helpful volume in which church leaders from Sweden, Germany, Hungary and many other countries report on their views and policies regarding populism and nationalism. I warmly recommend this book for any further study on this challenging theme.²⁷ I also recommend the text “Lutheran Identity”, published by the Institute for Ecumenical Research in Strasbourg in 2017.²⁸ This text is aware of the complexity and ambivalence of the notion of identity. It outlines an inclusive identity which is based on God’s gifts rather than distinctions between various ideologies.

The present paper wants to be a modest addition to the themes of which church leaders are increasingly aware. What I learned from studying Finnish populist internet sources is that these movements have their own ideological models and thematic areas which may be different from what we learn in our otherwise good and solid academic education.

It is vitally important to study what digital sources ordinary populists and ordinary Christian conservatives use when they discuss matters of liberalism and conservatism, or matters of identity, nationalism and globalism. These sources may differ from those offered in standard theological education. But some of them may nevertheless have considerable global significance and an unexpected intellectual appeal. For such reasons, my presentation has focused on such relatively unknown movements as identitarianism and integralism. I have very consciously left out many much more “populist” currents which we encounter in internet discussions. The most popular currents may need to be studied with the help of social sciences rather than theology or philosophy.²⁹ Identitarianism and integralism are relevant for the academic theologians and church leaders, as they show how intellectual frames can be added to populist and nationalist politics.

In my previous paper³⁰ I have shown how Finnish Christian populists programmatically use identitarian sources. I cannot say for certain whether this is the case with Christian populists in Norway or Sweden, but they certainly

sound very similar to their Finnish counterparts. It is also astonishing how closely the American and the Polish conservative Catholics are linked to one another in their theological argumentation. Other conservative Catholics use them as their sources, as the universally available English-speaking digital environment makes such use very easy.³¹ We academic theologians can see the genealogies of various discussions, as we have time and opportunity to study them in detail. What we can offer to church leaders are, therefore, documentary surveys of the existing discussion. With the help of such surveys, church leaders can make informed decisions regarding the challenges set by these movements.

¹ Cf. Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment* (London: Profile, 2018). Fukuyama highlights the need for social recognition. This theme has been studied in my Helsinki project, cf. Risto Saarinen, *Recognition and Religion: A Historical and Systematic Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and Maijastina Kahlos et al. (eds.), *Recognition and Religion: Contemporary and Historical Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2019).

² E.g. C. R. Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). In this book, Jose Pedro Zuquete's article "Populism and Religion", pp. 445-466, is particularly informative. Cf. also Lennart Byström, *Med Guds hjälp: om religion och politik i Ryssland, Ungern och Polen* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2017). Remarkably, the rapid developments of 2018-2019 have already made some of this information outdated.

³ Helge Simonness, *Kampen om korset i politikken* (Oslo: Vigmostad Bjørke, 2019).

⁴ Sylvi Listhaug, *Der andre tier* (Oslo: Kagge, 2018).

⁵ Cf. Jayne Svenungsson, "Uses and Abuses of Religion in Modern Europe", *Eco-Ethica* 8 (2019), n.p.

⁶ oikeamedia.com/o1-104429 (as of 7 Feb 2020).

⁷ Risto Saarinen and Heikki Koskinen, "Recognition, Religious Identity, and Populism: Lessons from Finland", forthcoming in Niels Henrik Gregersen & Pamela Slotte (eds.), *Reconfessionalisation* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press).

⁸ José Pedro Zuquete, *The Identitarians: The Movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2018), 11.

⁹ Zuquete 2018, 15-16.

¹⁰ Zuquete 2018 offers a documented overview of these, including Faye and Camus.

¹¹ Zuquete 2018, 11-25, 145, 220-222, 312.

¹² Cf. Zuquete 2018, 99-100, 301.

¹³ Cf. more generally Roger Chapman & James Ciment, *Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints and Voices, Second Edition* (London: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁴ Ryszard Legutko, *The Demon in Democracy: Totalitarian Temptations in Free Societies* (New York: Encounter, 2016).

¹⁵ I follow Adrian Vermeule's presentation of the book in his "Liturgy of Liberalism", *First Things*, January 2017.

¹⁶ Vermeule 2017, quoting legutko.

¹⁷ Legutko, "Nationalism, Conservatism, and the EU", *First Things*, October 2019. See also Legutko, "Against the Open Society", *First Things*, December 2019.

¹⁸ Patrick Deneen, *Why Liberalism Failed?* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2018).

¹⁹ Adrian Vermeule, "Finding Stable Ground", *First Things*, November 2016.

²⁰ Vermeule, "A Christian Strategy", *First Things*, November 2017.

²¹ Cf. Vermeule, "The Catholic Constitution", *First Things*, August 2017.

²² "Against Dead Consensus", *First Things*, March 2019.

²³ "Against the New Nationalism", *Commonweal*, 19 August 2019.

²⁴ Byström (ad loc) argues that the Reformed Church in Hungary has always collaborated with different political rules more closely than the Catholics. But Byström also underlines Orban's close ties with Catholicism.

²⁵ Cf. Jayne Svenungsson (footnote 5) and „Evangelischer Kirchentag in Dortmund: Die AfD muss draußen bleiben“, *Der Spiegel*, 19 June 2019.

²⁶ Cf. Risto Saarinen, "Euroopan kirkot pohtivat suhdettaan uusoikeistoon", *Kotimaa* 16 May 2019.

²⁷ Simone Sinn & Eva Harasta (eds.), *Resisting Exclusion: Global Theological Responses to Populism* (Geneva: LWF, 2019).

²⁸ Available at <https://www.strasbourg-institute.org/en/study-on-lutheran-identity/>.

²⁹ The Oxford Handbook of Populism (footnote 2) offers guidance in this field.

³⁰ Saarinen & Koskinen (footnote 7).

³¹ For instance, the website <https://thejosias.com> aims to be "a manual of Catholic Integralism".